thanks to Husserl, as Lipps' psychologism, but also to contrast their own position with Husserl's conception of phenomenology. The excerpt from a letter from Reinach to Conrad, quoted above, provides an eloquent illustration of their somewhat ambivalent attitude toward Husserl's phenomenology.
Interestingly, although the Munich phenomenologists were well aware of the influences of Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology upon Husserl's phenomenology, they never quite agreed with Husserl upon the identification of phenomenology with descriptive psychology as formulated in the first edition of the LI. There are good reasons to believe that Husserl's discussions with the Munich phenomenologists in 1904 played a significant role in his abandonment of the label of "descriptive psychology" in his 1905 lectures on the theory of judgement, attended by many Munich phenomenologists. 3 Expanding on these reasons will show that Husserl's rejection of "descriptive psychology" as a label for phenomenology was differently motivated than the Munich phenomenologists' rejection, as we will see in the first two sections of this paper.
What, then, were the motives that led the Munich phenomenologists to reject descriptive psychology? Building on case studies, in the last sections of this paper I will investigate in more detail the way the Munich phenomenologists conceived specific issues traditionally belonging to descriptive psychology, namely, the analysis of judgement, perception and sensation. This should show us not only that the Munich phenomenologists understood the key concepts of descriptive psychology in a different sense than Husserl, but also that they considered the casting of the analysis of these key concepts as descriptive psychology to be a commitment to a form of psychologism of which not only Lipps, but also Brentano, to some extent, was guilty. As I will try to show, their relation to descriptive psychology can be seen as paradigmatic of the strong realist position they soon endorsed regarding the nature of phenomenological descriptions.
Husserl's Account of Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology between the LI and the 1905 Lectures
Husserl's first published works in philosophy were conceived as contributions to the descriptive psychology outlined by Brentano in many of his Vienna lectures, which Husserl attended between 1884 and 1886. 4 The Philosophy of Arithmetic and Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic are maybe the most illustrative examples of these early contributions. 5 It is quite understandable in this context to read the following presentation of phenomenology in the first edition of the LI: "Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. Epistemological criticism is therefore in essence psychology, or at least only capable of being built on a psychological basis. Pure logic therefore also rests on psychology...." 6 (LI I, 176) In the second edition of the same work, he adjusted the latter statement significantly:
If our sense of phenomenology has been grasped, and if it has not been given the current interpretation of an ordinary 'descriptive psychology,' a part of natural science, than an objection, otherwise justifiable, will fall to the ground, an objection to the effect that all theory of knowledge conceived as a systematic phenomenological clarification of knowledge is built upon psychology. (LI I, 175) The clash between the first and second editions of the LI concerning descriptive psychology can be traced back to different articles written by Husserl in that period, for instance, in his review of Theodor Elsenhans' Das Verhältnis der Logik zur Psychologie (1903) , but also to some of his lectures between 1902-03 and the Urteilstheorie of 1905. 7 Still in 4 Husserl also had a good knowledge of many of Brentano's other lectures, as he had copies of lecture notes taken by other students. Many of these lecture notes on psychology, metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, etc., are still available at the Husserl Archive in Leuven. 5 See Edmund Husserl, Philosophy of Arithmetic (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003) and Edmund Husserl, "Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic," in Husserl: Shorter Works, (ed.) P. McCormick and F. Elliston (South Bend: University of Notre-Dame Press, 1981) , 126-42. In his abstract (Selbstanzeige) of the latter work, Husserl presented these studies as such. See Edmund Husserl, "Selbstanzeige," Archiv für systematische Philosophie, vol. 3 (1897) 9 Although these Munich phenomenologists already had a good knowledge of the Logical Investigations, Husserl was aware that he was facing a demanding audience whose background was definitely psychological, thanks to Lipps. 10 A year earlier, in 1904, Husserl had written to Lipps about his position against psychologism (Meine Stellung zum Psychologismus), in answer to Lipps' comment that Husserl's terminology was "too psychologistic" and in order to make clear that, in the LI, he considered pure logic as a theoretical science, independent of the practical science of psychology. 11 For a psychologist such as Lipps, the arguments against psychologism in the Prolegomena, the first volume of the LI, were simply incompatible with the descriptive psychological analysis of the second and third volumes. Lipps' complete misunderstanding of the arguments of the LI was then a further reason for Husserl to distantiate himself from the label of "descriptive psychology," a term also used by Lipps in Munich to characterise psychological analysis. It is easy to Husserl, Briefwechsel, vol. 3 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993 ), 157. 11 See Husserl, Briefwechsel, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993 understand that, in 1905, Husserl's abandonment of the label "descriptive psychology" was then inevitable, as it appeared in the 1905 supplement to the theory of judgement, written specifically for the attention of the Munich phenomenologists:
We distinguished phenomenology from descriptive psychology.... This is a nuance, but a nuance of fundamental importance.... While the phenomenologist describes the essence of sensory contents, he distinguishes essentially different kinds and genres thereof, like colour, sound, etc.... This all comes into question for the psychologist but still isn't psychology. That colour, sound etc. enter in a concrete empirical natural order as facts of nature, this is an issue for psychology. But it falls completely outside of phenomenology. What is determined phenomenologically concerns the redness in general, colour or extension in general, presentation and judgment in general, etc.... It holds transposably for every non real-empirical, i.e. every possible consciousness. The psychological-objectifying concern transforms phenomenology in descriptive psychology. All phenomenological determinations step into descriptive psychology only with a nuance, with a change of prefix so to speak. But phenomenology can and should be considered as pure doctrine of essences. According to its idea, it is not psychology, even not a descriptive one. If one doesn't understand this distinction at the outset, one will never understand the essence of an objective theory of knowledge. 12 12 UV, [43] [44] [45] There were therefore contextual reasons that led Husserl to abandon the label of descriptive psychology to characterise phenomenology. But one shouldn't read this passage simply as a rejection of descriptive psychology in general. This Vorlesung E, conceived specifically for the Munich phenomenologists, objected to descriptive psychology as it was practised in Munich. The rejection doesn't necessarily imply the rejection of Brentanian descriptive psychology as well, since Lipps and Brentano have two different conceptions of this discipline. According to Lipps, descriptive psychology is a description of the experiences of the empirical I which is given as the pole of all perceptions. 13 This conception of descriptive psychology has to handle heavier ontological commitments than the Brentanian, which is a science of acts or functions. According to Brentano, there is simply no "I" that is given empirically, and therefore no need to postulate such an I in the external world. 14 According to Brentano, psychological descriptions are metaphysically neutral, and it is precisely the same neutrality that we find in the characterisation of phenomenology presented in the Vorlesung E. In short, Husserl had good reasons to abandon the label of descriptive psychology, but these reasons weren't directly related to the Brentanian conception of descriptive psychology as such, but, in the first instance, with the conception of descriptive psychology advocated in Munich by Lipps. 13 See, for instance, Theodor Lipps, "Die Wege der Psychologie," Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Psicologia, (ed.) S. de Sanctis (Rome: Forzani, 1905) , 60. Lipps' student Pfa nder goes in a similar direction in refusing to reduce the I to a "bundle of perceptions," in Alexander Pfa nder, Einführung in die Psychologie (Leipzig: Barth, 1902; 1904) , 304ff. 14 This doesn't mean that Brentano thought the I was "unrettbar." His Wu rzburger lectures on metaphysics are clear on this point. But Brentano's "I," the inner perception, is only an incomplete self-consciousness. His position on the I lies somewhere between Ehrenfels' and Lipps'. For Brentano on the I, see Wilhelm Baumgartner, "Franz Brentano: 'Großvater der Phänomenologie,'" Studia Phaenomenologica, vol. 3 (2003) Forschung, vol. 14 (1960) , 452-66. I leave aside here the case of Max Scheler, which would need a treatment of its own.
David Katz and Erich Heinrich. 18 Remembering the encounter between the members of these three groups in the summer semester of 1905, Wilhelm Schapp sketches an interesting picture of the "Munich Invasion":
One day, it must have been in 1907, the Munichers were there, the Munich invasion of Go ttingen. I think it was a summer semester. They were Reinach, Conrad and the young Hildebrand. Geiger appeared occasionally. We used every opportunity, day and night, to engage in philosophical discussions with the Munichers. In our opinion, they were much ahead of us in every aspect. They did not have the devoutness that we had. Reinach blamed Husserl for his turn to the Marburg School, a turn that was already noticed in Munich.... We formed at that time a phenomenological association, which met every week and which was led for a while by Conrad. I remember that he tried to get more clarity on things by investigating the "meaning" of words, certainly in connection with the Munich investigations. Again and again, we were investigating word complexes, such as red wine, a wine being red, the wine is red. We looked for the relationship between word and meaning, concept and object. Sometimes, a word was said about the Munich standpoint, about the way they focussed on the platonician doctrine of metexein, the doctrine of participation in concepts, about the way they advanced the keen doctrine, in continuation of Husserl, that there is not only the "two" as ideal object, as Husserl taught at that time, but that there must be many, infinitely many twos.
The Munichers did not believe anymore in the sensation as constituent of perception and declared all such statements as construc- 140. Besides his reflections on the topic in his published words, Reinach's focus on the Meinen is also apparent in a letter to Conrad on 14 April 1904, quoted here in Schuhmann and Smith's translation: "[t]he question: how does the child know that grown-up people 'mean' something by their words, is answered by Lipps thus: it sees how they point to something and simultaneously hears a complex of sound....
[But] the problem was: how does the child come to understand an expression, and more specifically the expression of words? To this one surely cannot give an answer which involves appeal to another form of expression, to 'pointing.' For then of course the question still remains: How does the child know that by moving finally, its conception of perception, in which sensations are considered irrelevant to phenomenological analysis.
The first two aspects may be set aside so that we may focus on the third aspect, which directly relates to our present preoccupations. If sensations are said to be irrelevant to phenomenological analysis, it is easy to see that the Munich phenomenology of perception, at its core, opposes one of the basic tenets of Brentanian descriptive psychology, but also, to some extent, that it conflicts with Husserl's conception of sensations in the LI, as we shall see below.
What were the motives that led the Munich phenomenologists to discard sensations from the realm of phenomenological analysis and therefore to dissociate phenomenology from descriptive psychology? At first glance, it is hard to understand how they were led to do so, for not only did the Munich phenomenologists have a good knowledge of descriptive psychology, but its method was to a large extent compatible with their own.
Indeed, Munich had one of the rare German universities in which the philosophy of the school of Brentano was to some extent present. Georg von Hertling, Brentano's cousin and student, taught in Munich at that time, as did another of Brentano's students, Carl Stumpf (between 1889 and 1894), both of whom lectured in the Brentanian manner on psychology, ethics, logic and metaphysics. If not the most determinant motive, certainly one of the most determinant motives for their rejection of descriptive psychology lies in their reception of Husserl's critique of psychologism in the LI, especially in the Prolegomena. For many of the Munich phenomenologists who read the LI, psychologism quickly became the battle cry against every sort of philosophy that considered logic as a part of psychology-not only against Brentano's philosophy, but first and foremost against the philosophy of their own teacher, Lipps. This was the case with all of the Munich phenomenologists from the second group; Pfa nder, Reinach, Daubert and Geiger all considered the critique of psychologism as one of Husserl's greatest achievements in the LI. 23 But the question regarding how they came to consider descriptive psychology as a sign of a commitment to psychologism still remains. In this respect, Husserl himself may have played a prominent role with his letter to Lipps of 1904, titled Meine Stellung zum Psychologismus. On a visit to Go ttingen in 1904, Daubert discussed the content of the letter with Husserl and made a copy of it before it was sent to Lipps. 24 Along with those of Husserl's materials that came to Munich through Daubert, other such materials came in the hands of other Munich phenomenologists as well. 25 In his letter to Lipps, Husserl establishes the connection between descriptive psychology and psychologism: If "descriptive psychology" means description of the psychological, of the I-experiences, etc.…it has to be distinguished from phenomenology. Descriptive psychology describes the data related to the empirical consciousness as related to it as such, and so applies this data to the I, which is itself no datum, but rather something which is meant in supplement (Hinzugemeintes) through empiricaltranscendent apperception. The existence of an I, even of my own I (empirical object) remains an open issue for phenomenology: Enough that it is here, this moment of red, this presenting, this judging, etc.; that it is then taken as it is given in adequate perception, and that it serves furthermore to provide the fulfilling intuition and thus clarity to the conceptual intentions of words like proposition, truth, state of affairs, concept, object, being, necessity, etc. If we go back to the "proper meaning," to the "origin" of concepts, then the temptation of psychological empiricism disappears. 26 Here, according to Husserl, descriptive psychology describes the data of the empirical consciousness as belonging to an actual empirical consciousness and has to postulate the existence of an I as substratum of these determinations in order to validate these descriptions. This is what Husserl calls "the temptation of psychologistical empiricism [die Versuchung des psychologistischen Empirismus]." Following Husserl's point, phenomenology avoids this temptation by describing the red moment, or the presentings and judgings, independently of the actual prominent. See Karl Schuhmann, "Husserls Abhandlung 'Intentionale Gegenstände. ' Edition der ursprünglichen Druckfassung," Brentano Studien, vol. 3 (1990/91) , 140. We even find an indirect echo of this manuscript in Adolf Reinach, "Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüße bei Kant," Kant-Studien, vol. 16 (1911) The situation quickly deteriorated in the summer semester of 1906, when it came to a head between Lipps and his students. 29 It was then clear for the Munich phenomenologists that in order to practise phenomenology as they intended to do, especially since the "invasion of Go ttingen," they had to abandon descriptive psychology as promoted by Lipps in Munich.
In fact, in 1905-06 two factors combined: on the one hand, Husserl dissociated himself from descriptive psychology mainly because he wanted to avoid any misunderstanding coming from the Munich phenomenologists. On the other hand, the Munich phenomenologists rejected Lipps' descriptive psychology because they saw in it a commitment to psychologism. Husserl, for his part, insisted on preserving Brentano from this accusation. 30 Although the Munich phenomenologists too, at least publicly, seemed to exempt Brentano from this 29 Reported by Reinach to Husserl in a letter of 24 July 1906: "Too bad that the tension between Professor Lipps and us seems to be getting always bigger. At the very end of the semester, there was even a small incident.... In a lecture, I tried to show that there is not only a predication of the moral value in ethics, but that one must distinguish there between two basic categories.... The first is always referring to objects, the second to states of affairs. Lipps attacked these...positions very violently in a session of our private seminar. All these distinctions are not objectively well-founded, we are intoxicated by words, etc.... There then followed a few fruitless personal discussions where it became clear, however, that these questions were about fundamental oppositions. [Schade nur, dass accusation, they nevertheless remained profoundly critical of central issues of Brentanian descriptive psychology, as we will see in the following case studies.
Case Study I: Daubert on Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology
Let's return to Schapp's remark, quoted above: "The Munichers did not believe anymore in sensation as constituent of perception and declared all such statements as constructions; they still believed in acts and psychology, those weren't called into question." What was the motive of the Munich phenomenologists in discarding sensations as constituents of perception? In the first two parts of this paper, we have shown that their rejection of Lipps' descriptive psychology was based on its commitment to psychologism, which they recognised in it, thanks to Husserl.
But the claim reported by Schapp is much stronger than the simple rejection of descriptive psychology on the basis of its psychologism. In order to understand the link between the thesis about sensations and the rejection of psychologism, we have to reconstruct the Munch phenomenologists' position on the constituents of perception.
This reconstruction begins with Daubert. Already in 1902, Daubert had noticed the difficulty that will be raised later by Reinach concerning Brentano's concepts of existence and acceptance (Anerkennen). 31 Daubert's starting point for his PhD dissertation was Brentano's concept of judgement. He disagreed with Brentano about the sense of "acceptance" (Anerkennung) because, according to him, the being of objects is an irreducible datum upon which our acknowledgement is built, while for Brentano, we acquire the concept of being through reflection upon our actual judgings. 32 Soon after he introduced Husserlian phenomenology in Munich, Daubert worked out a distinction between psychology and phenomenology: according to him, descriptive psychology concerns the differ-31 See the drafts to Daubert's unfinished PhD dissertation, especially the parts one one-term judgement (eingliedrige Urteile) in MS A I 6 (here especially A I 6/10r). 32 See Daubert, MS A I 6/12r: "What cannot be the sense of acknowledging. It makes no sense to acknowledge an object as to its existence or being as such, if this all is obviously given.... What has to be given, so that I can acknowledge something (in the sense of judging)? [ ent types of thinking, and not the different types of thought, which is the task of phenomenology alone. 33 According to him, the conflict between phenomenology and descriptive psychology emerges from the opposition between two standpoints: from the phenomenological standpoint, we attribute to contents of consciousness a certain mental being (psychisches Sein), while from the standpoint of descriptive psychology, contents of consciousness are only mediators for the external objects they represent. The conflict arises when research in descriptive psychology aims at results that can only be obtained from a phenomenological approach: according to Daubert, the descriptive psychologist simply cannot phenomenologically describe contents of consciousness as objectually given (Bewußtseinsinhalt als Gegebenheit), since there is nothing psychical in what is immediately given. 34 In other words, my feeling of happiness has an object that is as real as the object of my feeling of a headache, or the object of my seeing of a house or even the object of my judging that A is greater than B. Phenomenologically considered, none of these objects are psychical and they are all given with the same immediacy. Sensations are thus com- 
Beschreibung und Analyse der verschiedenen Arten des Denkens.]"
34 See here, especially, Daubert, MS A I 4/109: "I may say, the contents of consciousness have mental being, they always have psychological elements even when I have them. Whether I'm aware of it or not is all the same, and this is quite right. But [this] only from the standpoint of a specific consideration.... They [the contents of consciousness] present objects to me and it is in their nature that they are not conscious as something and as something in itself. They are not contents of consciousness anymore when I reflect on them, but rather mental objects, objects of a specific class of reality, namely the mental being. Therefore: phenomenology and descriptive psychology are not the same, provided that there is nothing mental in the immediately given. pletely left outside phenomenological analysis. Moreover, according to him, they are neither accessible nor conscious from the phenomenological standpoint. 35 In one of his numerous drafts of his PhD dissertation, Daubert assumed that it is a contradiction to say that my experience is constituted by contents of sensation and modes of consciousness at the same time that we assume that our experience gives us the consciousness of an external object, with three dimensions, etc. 36 Contents of sensation belong to concrete experience, but they become qualities of perception only through their interpretation. To illustrate his position, Daubert gives the following example: I see my house from the street. From this perceptual experience, I can only distinguish my contents of sensation through psychological analysis, but these are not identical with my consciousness or with my perception of my house. Contents of sensation are two-dimensional: therefore, seeing a window, a brick wall, etc., implies that I am seeing more than what I actually feel through sensations. 37 Basically, Daubert's thesis is that perception implies at least the interpretation of sensations, but from the phenomenological standpoint, these sensations as such are a construction, they are not the proper elements of perception. When I say "I see the describing an experience that is itself constituted by the interpretation of my sensations. And, so to speak, when I say "I have a red sensation," this description, taken literally, doesn't have any meaning. For a Munich phenomenologist such as Daubert, sensations, unlike objects, are not and cannot be given in themselves. In this context, we can easily understand why, for Daubert, descriptive psychology accomplishes quite the opposite of what phenomenology aims to do. Phenomenology aims to describe our experience to the extent that it gives us objects, and not sensations.
But at the same time, Daubert's thesis is not quite the same as the thesis endorsed by Husserl in the LI. Husserl simply says that our contents of sensations are present, real contents, interpreted through perception-what he calls the interpretative form of perception (Auffassungsform der Wahrnehmung). For Husserl, unlike for Daubert, contents of sensation are real contents and therefore constitutive of perception, although they are not what is meant in perception. Daubert, on the contrary, seems to believe that perception is exclusively constituted by meaning (Meinen).
Understanding "meaning" (Meinen) under "perception" appears, at first glance, to be quite similar to the Brentanian notion that defines perception through judgement, i.e., through the acceptance/rejection of a presented object. After all, both positions attribute to intentionality a central role in perception. The major difference between the two views is that, according to Brentano, perception is nothing other than an attitude of acceptance or rejection toward a content, while, according to Daubert, it is a contradictio in adjecto to say that we "mean a content." What we perceive or mean is always an object.
But this is not the only difference between the two positions. As we shall see in our second case study, the Munich phenomenologists also rejected the Brentanian thesis that every perception, being a judgement, involves a belief. They held, and Reinach most prominently, that the belief moment is not constitutive, by itself, of judgement: it is necessary to distinguish an assertive moment as well.
Case Study II: Reinach's Critique of Brentano's Theory of Judgement
Reinach's "On the Theory of Negative Judgments" is known as an apology for states of affairs in ontology, but it also contains a critique of Brentano's theory of judgement, which deserves to be discussed here. The basic idea of this critique is summarised in the following paragraph:
I hear, say, the judgment "a is P" expressed; I understand it, reflect upon it, and then I utter a consenting "Yes." In this "Yes" lies a consent, an acceptance; but even here the acceptance is not a judgment. For which judgment should it be? The judgment "a is P"? Certainly not. For this judgment evidently relates to the being P of a, to this state of affairs, but the acceptance which we now have before us relates rather to the judgment "a is P." And that the state of affairs is not the same as the judgment which posits it requires no special emphasis. I can even bring in the original judgment alongside, and say: "Yes; a is indeed P." Here we have consenting acceptance and judgment next to each other, as evidently different. 38 As noted earlier, according to Brentano, the judgement itself constitutes an acceptance or rejection of a presented object. In expressing my judgement through the statement "a is P," I accept a being P. In his critique of Brentano, Reinach defends the propositionalist standpoint and takes the form "a is P" as fundamental and irreducible, whereas Brentano reduces this form to an acceptance. According to Reinach, if the sentence is an acceptance or rejection, it has to be an acceptance or rejection of an articulated judicative content (e.g., the being P of a, etc.), for an object, simple or complex, cannot be accepted or rejected as such, and it doesn't have a meaning as such. 39 The least one can say of an object is that it exists, or that it is real. According to Reinach, and unlike Brentano, the content of the judgement "a is" is that a exists. It is this relation between a and its existence that is accepted and affirmed, not a itself.
The strategy developed by Reinach allows him to distinguish between two different meanings of "judgement": judgement as conviction or belief and judgement as assertion. In an assertion, an object is meant, while in a conviction, a content is presented. According to Reinach, these two levels in judicative acts are fundamentally distinct:
...the term "judgment" is to be understood in two senses, on the one hand as assertion, which relates to its objectual correlate in acts of meaning which may or may not be accompanied by intuitions, and on the other hand as conviction or belief which develops out of more or less intuitive acts of presentation. This implies that we must speak also of the negative judgment in two senses, and thus already the problem of the negative judgment has been raised up onto a new level. 40 In the first meaning of judgement, we understand an affirmation. Intensity doesn't play any role here: I assert P-or I don't; there is no in-between. Besides, assertions have meanings, they mean (meinen) something. These two features are not involved when we speak of judgement in the second sense, namely, as conviction or belief. I may judge that there is water on Mars, and that I am the author of the present paper. These two assertions vary strongly in degree of conviction, the first having a degree of conviction much weaker than the second. If Reinach agrees partially with Brentano about the fact that judgements understood as convictions are based on presentations, he doesn't think that this holds for judgements understood as assertions. Assertions have meaning (Meinung), not presentations, as presuppositions. 41 In short, Reinach's critique of Brentano's theory of judgement aims to show the lack of a distinction between two phenomenologically different moments in every judicative act: the conviction and the assertion, which are, to speak in the realistic spirit of Munich phenomenology, two different essences. Reinach's critique of Brentanian descriptive psychology moves in the same direction as Daubert's point on perception and meaning: one simply cannot describe what belongs to the realm of meaning (Meinen) and assertion in terms of conviction or from the standpoint of descriptive psychology.
Concluding Remarks
We have seen that there were contextual reasons that led Husserl to abandon the label of descriptive psychology as characterising phenomenology, although this abandonment meant neither the rejection of the discipline as such nor a rejection of Brentanian descriptive psychology in particular. In abandoning the label, Husserl wanted to distantiate himself from the works of Lipps, who considered descriptive psychology a description of the experiences of the empirical I, given as the pole of all perceptions. In short, Husserl's reasons for abandoning the label were directed not against the Brentanian conception of descriptive psychology, but more specifically against the conception of descriptive psychology advocated in Munich by Lipps.
In order to understand the effects of the Munich invasion of Go ttingen in 1905-06, we have to consider two factors: the first is Husserl's dissociation from descriptive psychology in the Vorlesung E, in order to avoid misunderstandings coming from the Munich phenomenologists, and the second lies in the fact that the Munich phenomenologists rejected Lipps' descriptive psychology because they saw in it a commitment to psychologism. This explains, in my view, their deeply critical attitude toward the central issues of Brentanian descriptive psychology. And, in fact, as we have seen in our two case studies, the realist position developed by the Munich phenomenologists was not only connected with, but also depended on the association they established between descriptive psychology and psychologism. According to Daubert, descriptive psychology and phenomenology, as two different standpoints, necessarily involve two different ontological realms (mental experiences versus objects) that are exclusive to each of them. In this context, sensations and judgements understood as beliefs must be ruled out of phenomenological investigation, since, according to the Munich phenomenologists, the phenomenology of perception has only to do with objects. When they analyse acts of judgement, they don't need to rely on abstraction, as does Brentanian descriptive psychology; rather, they simply grasp the essences of these acts, which are objects of phenomenological investigation. 42 frechette.guillaume@me.com 42 An earlier version of this paper was presented at Concordia University in May 2010 at the Symposium in Honour of the 100 th Anniversary of the Go ttingen Circle. Many thanks to the participants for their stimulating comments and especially to the organiser, Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray. Thanks also to SSHRC for its financial support.
